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A B S T R A C T
Theoretical interpretations and attempts at instrumentalisation 
of the ties and exchanges between philosophy and architecture 
have mostly been directed at questions of language or the 
institutionalisation of the discipline of architecture. In this text, 
I suggest a different approach to philosophical engagement 
in architecture: a simultaneous use in the methodology of 
the architectural project and constitution of a philosophy of 
architecture, not only as a question of interdisciplinary exchange, 
but as an integral part of comprehensive architectural processes, 
with philosophy still maintaining its original authenticity. My 
approach is twofold: explain the methodology and delineate 
its framework, but also raise the question what is an architect’s 
philosophical platform. To that end, I will attempt to elaborate 
three models: 1) the first delves partially into the fields of fiction 
and illusion, and in it the architect adopts the role (position) of the 
philosopher, 2) the second model is the architectural engagement 
of philosophical notions, and 3) the third is the use of philosophical 
concepts in the creation of architectural ones. Corresponding to 
each, I will suggest the activity of “repetition of difference” as a 
possibility of creation of the authentic architectural concept. 
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University of Belgrade - Faculty of Architecture201
S A J _ 2017 _ 9 _
INTRODUCTION
To the bipartite title, we should add two asymmetrical remarks about how to 
read this text. The first refers to my intention of taking my position of equal 
parts of architect, theorist, and practitioner to thematise the complicated relation 
between architecture and philosophy. The complications are endless, there are 
myriad of questions of interdisciplinary exchange, authenticity as well as the 
question of production – all of which is constantly redefining this relation. 
However, beyond all questions, my premise is that architecture, analogously 
to philosophy, as Deleuze and Guattari proposed in What Is Philosophy? is 
the creation of concepts.1 More specifically, architecture as well as philosophy 
is “(…) the art of the forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts.”2 [“(…) 
la philosophie est l’art de former, d’inventer, de fabriquer des concepts.”]3 
To this sentence fragment, I add that all three verbs used (forming, inventing, 
fabricating) explicitly indicate the creation of the new. Thus, the first comment 
creates a specific environment in which the projection of the premise is read as 
a question: how to create concepts? The second remark holds a partial answer 
to the previous question. It is bound to the second part of the title and also 
speaks to the method of the text itself as well as (partially) to the elaboration 
of the method the text suggests. That is to say, what I wish to show is that 
the architectural use of philosophy, by which I mean philosophical concepts, 
is in the first instance similar to ‘work’ or an activity that is more similar to 
the conception of ‘emancipation’ of difference I find in Deleuze’s concept of 
“difference and repetition.”4 What follows is a matter of pure “difference” or 
“difference repetition” or the potential of difference. This “difference” or the 
particular can become authentic material, the potential for creation or even for 
further architectural production.
THE PYRAMID AND THE DREAM: 
BETWEEN DISAPPEARANCE AND DEMATERIALISATION 
OF THE ARCHITECTURAL SUBJECT 
Despite all the great relations interpreted by philosophy, the relation that has 
marked it as a whole, according to Theodor Adorno, is that of subject-object. 
This relation has traced its contemporary flow, so that it has become “the 
only philosophy: the philosophy of the subject.”5 Adorno resolves the central 
problem of philosophy, the question of coexistence of the subject and object, in 
favour of the subject, finding confidence in the subject as opposed to the object. 
Subject-object, the co-dependent (non-)homogeneous pair is one of the essential 
constitutive blocks of philosophy, but also of architecture, and as a definition, 
it will always hold this complex relation together. Architecture has always been 
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have been, it has always thematised the subject of architecture as an ‘author’ 
of the architectural (ideal) object. Yet, with “What Is an Author?”, Foucault 
suggested the idea of the literal disappearance (death) of the author.6 The 
subjectivity of the author7 can always be demonstrated through the objectivity 
of their creation.8 The subject of architecture exists by way of their creation; 
but paradoxically, by ensuring the autonomy to their object, that is, in the act 
of materialisation, the subject proves their own ‘objective’ disappearance. This 
is the process of cleaving of subject from their object. Hence, the relation and 
proximity of subject-object in architecture are complete only in the process of 
creation. In a way, Foucault has substituted the author with the trace of his 
absence, simultaneously abolishing his individuality. If we placed Foucault’s 
disappearance of the author in the same plane with Adorno’s fundamental 
subject-object relation, in the very next instance, the disappearance of the author 
(the subject) opens the question of lacuna in the place of the subject.
I would now like to sketch a few ways of ‘disappearance of author’, resisting 
Foucault’s thesis of the death of the author. Indicating various techniques of 
authorial presence and absence, my aim is to explain temporary positions 
of the subject of architecture, that is, the functional change of the architect 
‘into’ a philosopher, maintaining the object as the point of reference. These 
directions of modification of the subject of architecture are entirely in 
accordance with Baudrillard’s definition of the disappearing as an art form, 
“art of disappearance.”9 Following Baudrillard, the real world starts to exist, 
paradoxically, with its simultaneous “disappearance.” Or, when things begin to 
disappear, the concept emerges: “the real vanishes into the concept.”10 These 
sentences provide me with the foothold for disappearance always generating 
“a” creation, and for expecting these processes to create a new concept, the 
concept of the subject or concept of the object. By way of this understanding 
of the art of disappearance, we can explain the beginning of the existence of 
the subject of architecture in some new (philosophical) reality. More simply, 
this is the self-conceptualisation of the architect with the goal of redefining 
the authorial potential to create. Further, the position in between theory and 
practice means that the subject of architecture always alternates between 
gesture and process, spurring the two forms Greg Lynn calls “(…) the author 
that makes the gesture, but (…) the author that makes the process.”11 Whether 
the idea of the contemporary author in architecture is a question of a “new 
kind of author before the digital”12 or very different interests for abstract forms 
of the subjectivity of the architect, somewhere between the designer and 
theorist – does not seem to be crucial. The potential for change and possibility 
of self-transformation of the architect, as Eisenman himself confirms, are 
legitimate ways of conceptualisation in architecture. Cyclical transgressions 
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of the architect into other neighbouring areas as the expression of the will and 
desire for radical change of context and perspective of thought are only some 
of the models of the “disappearance of the author.” Eisenman elaborates an 
example of such transgression in the particularity transformation of Corbusier’s 
person: “(…) he was able to produce transfiguration out of figure in the work. 
In other words, not literal transfiguration but the conceptual idea of figure…”13 
The processes of transfiguration that assume self-abstraction do not also mean 
the reduction or removal of the figure of the architect. For me, this is the 
kind of abstraction that Deleuze formulates as “an invention of other spaces 
with original sorts of mixture or assemblage prodigious,”14 or revealing and 
occupying new inspirational and ‘other’ territories. Thus, through alternating 
positions and experimentation with various media, Corbusier transformed his 
own architectural role.15 What is important, however, in all acts and projects, 
from macro-urban project such as plans for the city of Paris to the aesthetic 
acts of text and image in The Poem of the Right Angle (Le Poème de l’Angle 
Droit),16 in any architectural gesture, we can see the authentic ‘traces of 
absence’ of the author. If we look more closely at these processes, we can see 
that with a decision or intuition of transformation, whether done analytically 
through science, instinctively through language or drawing, or through the 
implementation and introduction of (virtual) technology, it is always a matter of 
architectural necessity for conceptualisation and mastery over reality. This is the 
moment when architects adopt another philosophical reality in order to assume 
a critical position towards their own. Aside from intuitive transformation, the 
precision of philosophy undoubtedly forces us towards taking one step further, 
to the question of notion, concept, and language. Perhaps it is only a matter of 
processes in order to present and explain things to ourselves, to name them and 
create the possibility of conceptualising and using them. Or else it is a change 
of dimension for the acceleration of time in order to reach our architectural 
object more quickly. Again, returning to Baudrillard’s thesis that the concept 
appears with disappearance, simultaneously return to architectural reality by 
eliminating what has already appeared.
I see such a radical and specific model of  “self-conceptualisation” of the architect 
in the complex work of Peter Eisenman. Among the many interpretations of 
this historic figure in architecture, Jörg Gleiter’s interpretation, refracted in a 
single sentence, is perhaps the best testament to its radical nature: “How to 
eliminate what one becomes – this is one way of summarising one of the most 
decisive features of Eisenman’s architectural praxis: the disappearance of the 
author.”17 Recalling Barthes’ text, “Death of the Author,”18 and Eisenman’s 
drawing on Foucault’s What Is an Author?, Gleiter’s gestures paint an author 
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function to critical operativeness. This is no mere discursive decomposition of 
the author or annihilation of the relation between architect and his work. It is a 
translation of the author’s capacities into the contingency of critical approach 
to the discipline and the architectural definition of the world. Thus, toward the 
question “what is an author?”, Gleiter projects the question, “what is critique?”, 
(once again an echo of Foucault19) in order to explain the “elimination of the 
author.” It is clear that for the sake of the ‘meta’ plan (or project),20 the (ex) 
change of Eisenman’s work and specific architectural critique will rest more 
heavily on the latter. However, perhaps here we could allow ourselves the 
freedom of a third question, which neither Foucault nor Eisenman poses: “what 
is (an architectural) creation?” In so doing, following the trace of absence of 
the personal of the created,21 perhaps we could understand the basic relation 
between the architect and philosopher. This is not an abstraction of an architect 
in the ‘body’ of the philosopher, but rather an idea of a relation of two subjects, 
a philosopher and an architect, mutually defined. The tensions and states of 
absence (of the object) equalise theoretical and practical action of the subjects, 
allowing for the appearance of those processes that define experience in which 
‘one’ subject forms and alters the ‘other’. 
The need of the architect for abandoning their fundamental ‘territory’ is the 
necessity of the continuous redefinition of the relations within their work. Yet, 
perhaps more significantly, it is a possibility for the activation of creative critical 
abilities to produce, both theoretically and practically. Architecture is first and 
above all about the production of concepts, which is why the dislocation or 
temporary transfiguration of the architect into the “body of the philosopher,” a 
natural architectural occurrence. The whole idea of necessary ‘fleeing’ towards 
one’s otherness, towards a different geography or philosophy, is the architect’s 
search for a new, original position and definition of meta-territory. For Jean 
Nouvel, all actions and strategies in architecture have as their aim to define 
an unknown location as the “locus of a secret.”22 In the relation between the 
idea, concept, and project, there is the architectural decision of what we wish to 
control, what to provoke, but also, what we willingly cede to the uncontrollable.23 
But what is important architecturally, in all these actions, is the ‘establishing’ 
of the object in space and time simultaneously with the dematerialisation of the 
architectural subject. Paradoxically, dematerialisation indicates existence, while 
disappearance points to absence. The ‘dematerialisation’ of the architect in the 
process of design is equal to the existence of the subject through the inevitable 
motions using at once dislocation and distortion, just how Sloterdijk described 
the case of the figure of Derrida. The principle of dislocation establishes an 
interruption with “full presence,” with spatial displacement and redisposition. The 
double meaning of ‘distortion’ that Sloterdijk borrowed from Freud24 indicates 
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two kinds of change: in appearance, but also as a possibility for something (or 
someone) to be taken to be elsewhere.25 Here we arrive to the critical dimension 
of the author of architectural works. The subject of architecture is never fully 
and permanently free; they-subject-author always belongs to a given context 
by way of their object. This attempt at making a terminological (but no less 
strategic) distinction in the appearance of the subject, in order for it not to come 
second (like Freud’s distortion), to change position through spatial displacement 
and redisposition, seems very important to me because it introduces different 
forms of self-conceptualisation of the architect. In that sense, Sloterdijk’s 
thematisations give a complex insight into other ways of dematerialisation, 
while also indicating a shift from the question of production of object to context 
and location of author with regard to meta-territory. Within these horizons, there 
is a radical revelation regarding the meaning of the author, including the risk of 
assigning to their text (object) lesser value than to the broader context to which 
their words (or object) belong and in which they are reflected. The subject’s 
temporarily-found freedom through displacement and appearance elsewhere 
will allow for achieving the complete creative engagement of the architect. 
Besides that, a complete change of context becomes an architectural strategy for 
the author to once again appear in an entirely different way in a different form or 
formation within their own discourse. The phenomenon of architectural fear of 
belonging and limitation in time is explained by an essential creative impotence 
that comes with the finitude itself. Therefore, the principle of disappearance and-
or dematerialisation, such as the ‘first’ contingency of the architectural subject, 
can be seen in the metaphor of ‘pyramid’. With its mythological potential, it 
offers an idea of the Other. Architectural disappearance produces a new reality, 
like the concept that disappears in the real, meaning that the ‘dream’ as creation, 
the arrival and appearance, or else, as the ‘second’ contingency, a metaphor of 
the phenomenology of architectural aesthetic gesture of the role, the character, 
figure, engagement. With their complete removal from this discourse and their 
own practice, the architect temporarily adopts the philosopher’s role to allow 
for new creation through the act of return.
WORDS AND OBJECTS OF THE AUTHOR
Any form of production in architecture is necessarily an activity or gesture 
of representation of presence. Objects in architecture, material or not, 
always reflect the meaning that seek its own word, expression, or manifesto. 
However, if we are still resting on the notion that architecture, analogously to 
philosophy, is the creation of concepts, then architecture also produces with 
words. Derrida saw the potential for creation in words, a capacity to produce, 
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(the French) language. Indeed, this was the interest in “the body of the word” 
that “is not present to itself,” and moments when words slip from their original 
discourse by acquiring new functions.26 In these cases, flouting their basic 
function, words become what essentially does not belong to language, become 
the capacity for something Other. The production of ambivalent states that 
can be achieved through words hints at the existence of the idea that action 
is possible within text and with text. Speaking architecturally, it is true that 
words enable or offer that which is not ‘now’ or that which is not yet real or 
that which has not yet been actualised through the object’s presence. Every 
architectural object begins its existence with a concept, confirming its presence 
of reflections of concepts in words, even when the concept is not entirely 
materialised. Eisenman has placed ‘language’ as the inevitable mediator and 
participant in the act of transfer of architectural meaning, nearly to the point of 
equalising it with the architecturally materialised object. He interprets the final 
metaphysics of architecture as object-text, whose entirety and completeness 
is established in a superposed state of presence and presence absence.27 By 
indirectly deconstructing the role of the architect through conceptualising 
Eisenman’s work, Derrida asked a very important question: “What are words 
for an architect?”28 Beyond all the physical and metaphysical uses of words in 
architecture, the value of words can be simply found in what Derrida called 
“the body of the word:”29 even when non-discursive, a word that could use the 
ability to avoid form in order to create, can be used discursively. In that sense, 
terms borrowed from philosophy (as the “body of the word”) become a resource 
for architecture, entities, sequences, signs or particles – instruments (and not 
mere media) for the fashioning of devices and structures of the architectural 
conceptual system. We have here the creation of a framework with a high degree 
of abstraction of philosophical notions on a meta-level. This is a level on which 
both the technology and methodology are shaped that will detect, establish, 
and formulate the architectural problem. In addition to enabling the production 
of specific connections and structure the architectural system of thinking, the 
philosophical notions become ‘intensities’ in architectural processes. That is to 
say, aside from the change in thought perspective, they allow for the movement 
and dynamic with the idea of possibility of control of space and time. The 
genesis of architectural concepts is followed by the establishment of a complex 
set of relations: from projecting/designing subject-object positions to a whole 
network of designed, contextual, symbolic, spatial and temporal relations. In 
order for the entire process to be controlled, the use of philosophical notions as 
blocks for generating a stable architectural linguistic structure is their basic use 
in architecture. A set of notions as well as the distinction of a particular notion 
often conditions and establishes direct terminological thematisations through 
the design process – conspicuous in the aesthetic of the project. This is similar 
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to Tschumi’s notions of ‘event’ or ‘movement’, or else Nouvel’s thematisations 
of notions of ‘dematerialisation’ or ‘illusion’. In that sense, projecting a diagram 
or network of notions is a process that follows the creation of an architectural 
concept or theory, but also design processes and the overall processes or the 
architectural project.
The choice of philosophical notions for the analytical structuring of the 
methodology of an architectural project is also a question of stability of the 
method of the process itself, while conceptualisation demands destabilisation, 
decomposition, or deconstruction of both the system and its notions. The 
creation of architecture always demands an exit beyond its material context into 
a deeper logic of production of reality from which potentially emerges even 
the relation that can be described with words as ‘the feel’ of a text. This means 
that an architect will use the word and text to enable the idea thematisation 
within and beyond the architectural project. Reading and drawing with notions 
becomes the motion (movement) towards the problem and its reality, or else 
simply a way for the notion to appear as an idea that will be thematised by the 
project. In that case, the notion remains closely tied to the image or drawing 
that follows it. Analogies and the parallelism of the notion and drawing begin 
to build an unusual form, integrated drawing and notion. And in the attempt to 
achieve the purpose of the architectural process, they begin to build authentic 
architectural representations. For example, in the theoretical project, The 
Manhattan Transcripts, Tschumi used the architectural interpretation of reality 
with plans, sequences, and diagrams to simultaneously introduce the ‘notions’, in 
order to emphasise the very purpose of the transcript.30 Therefore, he represents 
the complex relations between space and its use, the set and script, type and 
programme, objects and events, through a sequence of drawings and notions. 
This method allows for the traditional architectural elements (drawing) to be 
criticised and verified by words, only to merge with them into unified meaning. 
The notion and drawing in architecture indicate that there is no disjunction 
between words and architectural objects, much as there is no disjunction 
between concepts and their use – in the way Wittgenstein has shown.31
THE SPHERE OF DREAMS
Deleuze constructed the plane of immanence as an abstract machine or consistent 
landscape of concepts, wherein “(…) concepts are the infinite speeds of finite 
movements that, in each case, pass only through their own components.”32 
The architectural character of Deleuze’s plans, the plane of immanence, 
composition and reference, including the whole spectrum of projection (of 
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architectural theory and practice. Aside from that, actualising the virtual, or the 
idea that in ‘chaos’ there could very well be structure and order. But also, when 
it comes to technical changes in interpretation of space and time, dimension and 
speed, Deleuze’s theories offer endless conceptual and aesthetic, intuitive and 
epistemological architectural potential. Despite all its theoretical strongholds, 
the contemporaneity of projection of the philosophical-architectural relation 
is refracted through the question of how to directly engage the philosophical 
concept? That is, what are the possible reflections of a particular philosophical 
concept in architecture?
Using elements and the logic of space, as metaphor and model, Peter Sloterdijk 
developed his theory of spheres: “trilogy on spheres” (Plurale Sphärologie).33 
He used text to materialise the “architecture of foam” in order to construct 
space as a crucial anthropological category. All the philosophical questions of 
spherology, what space could be, what we expect space to be, what we can 
offer as future space, are also fundamental architectural questions. In the theory 
of spheres, the outside as the product of the inside and people as the effect of 
space they create, delineate the contemporary architectural dilemma: where is 
the limit of architectural space. Philosophical concepts are projected through 
processes of ‘aesthetisation’ of cross sections of the interior and exterior, 
the ideologisation of cosmological questions of time and space, but also the 
thematisation of fundamentally intimate relationship of space and the human – 
are all explicit interpretation of spatial-temporal relations and forms of reading 
space, and as such are directly utilisable in the methodology of the architectural 
project. The construction of “protective islands” as forms of border spaces for 
the satisfaction of the human need to ‘immunise’ existence,34 paradigmatically 
offers specific criticism about the architectural constitution of (the ideal) object. 
Further, the poetry of space as well as shape offered by the various spheres 
and micro-spherological phenomena, become the topic of architectural design. 
Thus, these ‘spheres’, bubbles, globes or foam can be introduced into the 
‘sphere of architecture’, as complete architectural models due to their literal 
spatial description, their capacity to adopt geometries and constructions, 
but also the aesthetic of architectural space or particular object. Even more 
significantly, the morphological theory of the spheres leads in fact directly 
to the architectural question of projection. Each form of created space has its 
projection, meaning that the question of projection refers directly to the process 
of spatial creation. The trilogy of spheres encompasses the architectural problem 
of not only the projective and anthropological dimension, but many questions 
from geometry, generic conceptions, morphogenesis, transparency and form, 
all the way to the literal construction of forms and space. The problem of the 
universal and the cosmological, the question of multiplication, like bubbles, 
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or else questions of the universal, such as drawing on slated globes point to 
Sloderdijk’s theory providing a clear technology and method of application in 
architectural conceptualisation, as well as direct phenomenological projections. 
Latour’s networks35 – at first glance similar, yet entirely different – can also be 
used as architectural tools. The conceptual aspect of the network offered by 
Latour are manifold, from metaphors of sublime “fragility”36 of the network 
(des réseaux) or the idea of empty space which the network comprises, to the 
complex relations of proximity and distance, node and line, digital and analog. 
Nearly infinite models offered by this ‘network’ system, that is, the capacity 
to deconstruct the distinction of proximity-distance by a change of scale, of 
changing the inner-outer relations by control of dimension, and to relativise 
time by connecting unconnected elements – all makes the ‘networks’ entirely 
utilisable as architectural diagrams. 
Between the architectural diagram and model, the philosophical concept of 
the rhizome37 projected by Deleuze and Guattari introduces into architecture 
(but also philosophy!) entirely authentic, ‘new’ structures of thought. The 
six principles with which they described the particularity of the rhizome are 
explicitly usable as a formal principle in the methodology of architectural 
project.38 I would like to distinguish between the principles and all the other 
characteristics of the rhizome into two groups. The first refers directly to the 
morphology, the structure, the shape and form. The second group refers to 
processes. The rhizome, a type of branching of the root expanding horizontally, 
with all its multiplied variations, reveals a clear spatial principle of expansion, 
but also the idea of mapping of territory and fundamental stabilizing of ‘soil’. 
The identity of this structure or its nature that generates multiplicities, offers 
infinite possibilities of expansion, which is a nearly perfect expression of the 
architectural modelling of space. The geometric forming (in the full sense 
of contemporary geometries) of morphological, structural, certainly spatial 
theories, we convert into morphological configurations of architectural 
concepts, but also into specific forms of spatial realities. Real implications of 
this philosophical concept, systemic openness, de-centeredness, and resistance 
to hierarchy, influence the idea of openness of the architectural concept. 
Architecturally speaking, what is always constructed along with the processes 
of construction is the technology itself that reorganises both space and its 
creation. The expansion of territory by mapping it in a rhizomatic structure, and 
the possibility of broad ‘grounding’ undoubtedly becomes the critical apparatus 
of physical dimensions of space, growing into theories of infinite ‘openness’ in 
which contemporary architects could place new platforms, generic structures 
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Thus, the architectural engagement of the philosophical concept has myriad 
roles. In addition to direct theoretical application, paradoxically, their formal 
aesthetic potential becomes significant just like the question of strategy of 
occupying space (through a horizontally rhizomatic structure, cosmological 
Sloterdijk’s spheres or networks that convert empty spaces into architectural 
diagrams). It is a matter of the creation of new territories, thought and space, 
a change in dimension and speeding up of time by exchange of concepts. 
Donald Schön suggested a theory of “displacement concepts” in which each 
new (architectural) concept appears on top an old one.39 This idea evokes ideas 
of background, which we also find in Deleuze’s definition of environment.40 
In the contemporary world of exhaustion through endless possibilities enabled 
by the precision of digital technology, the question arises how to create new 
concepts, how to actually maintain philosophy and architecture (as concept 
creation), and with this the creation of the world and reality. This problem is 
underscored by Stiegler, not only by asking what could be the new concepts, but 
the more important question of how technology will project the new concepts? 
Literally, what are the potentialities of creation of new concepts?41 Stiegler 
sees a resource for the possibility of creation of the new in the potential of 
“the dream.” Perhaps this is why ‘new’ productions of architecture can be seen 
as a reflection of new techniques and methodologies for the creation of new 
concepts. Thus, the philosophical-architectural ‘exchange’ is no longer merely a 
question of exchange of concepts, but a problem of (common) techniques of the 
construction of ‘the dream’ in which  the (architectural) concept would appear. 
REPETITION OF DIFFERENCE
According to Wolff, to have a notion (Begriffe) of something means that we 
can think of it when we have a mental representation about it.42 The notion 
can be represented with an image or a drawing.43 This is the first important 
‘difference’ we can make here in ‘repeating the notion’. To be sure, not the 
notion, but repeating the notion as the representation with an architectural image 
or drawing. The difference is always defined as the particularity that appears 
as an excess compared to the established value. Therefore, the difference is 
what always appears as new in relation to the previous. Besides, the difference 
is always undetermined, its appearance anticipated from the unidentical. For 
this reason, the architectural engagement of the philosophical concept does 
not encompass the literal transposition or repetition of the conceptual content; 
rather, it includes the creation of unidentity, through changes in dimension 
and time. The architect must execute the transformation of the philosophical 
concept in order to reach the precision and clarity of their architectural concept. 
Philosophical concepts bring a kind of logical order, a consistency and stability 
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to the architectural concept. Moreover, when they are directly architecturally 
engaged in the processes of projection of the architectural concept, they assume 
responsibility for a much greater complexity and dynamic. Therefore, not only 
do they create universal order, philosophical concepts and notions but allow 
for the creation of further and more detailed actions and processes. For the 
architect, the philosophical concept, apart from its critical role, enables further 
production of yet more differences and concepts, plans of immanence and 
architectural platforms. Rather than systematising and interpreting, they create 
strategies how to ‘differentiate’ and how to produce the new. In this way, the 
role in between the philosopher and architect becomes defined by the relation 
of the analogous (difference) and digital (repetition). All the already elaborated 
models and uses of philosophical concepts complementing one another, can 
be combined, although paradoxically, on their own, they never achieve the 
authentic architectural concept. Therefore, I suggest an activity of emancipation 
of difference, as the condition for the new creation of the “different,” that is the 
authentic in architecture. This means that by repetition of various philosophical 
concepts one emancipates the difference that is not philosophical, and as such is 
subject to a further procedure of architectural repetition that produces specific 
architectural value. This is the new potential in architecture.
CONCLUSION, OR WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 
(DRAWING AND DIFFERENCE)
There are several more or less complex ways to approach the question from 
the title of this text. The first is with the original, Nietzsche’s question, “Why I 
Write Such Good Books?” The second, with Derrida’s ‘quip’, that is, question: 
“Why Peter Eisenman Writes Such Good Books?”, as well as with Eisenman’s 
response that Derrida translates into irony, or the many interpretations of 
Nietzsche’s question. All the answers carry ideas of the specific relation of the 
architectural creation and philosophical thinking. Eisenman coined the phrase 
“The Architectural Philosophy” and paradoxically, by bringing these words 
together (architecture & philosophy), attempted to create their distance. Still, 
above all, what is always present is the simple idea about the exchange of 
‘objects’ from philosophy and architecture, as technique and method, as well 
as ideas about mutual criticism and inspiration in the processes of creation. 
Philosophical and architectural concepts are never identical. On the meta-level, 
philosophy deals with universal positions, whereas architecture concerns itself 
with projections of space and time. All contemporary problems of the world 
and reality, philosophy and architecture, essentially reduce to the question 
how to create new concepts. This includes current questions of techniques 
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is, new dimensions of space and new ideas of time. Philosophers ‘delineate’ 
the thinking of the universal, surpassing demonstrations of relations of space 
and time, all the while providing the basis for their interpretation, as capacity 
for further drawing. For this reason, while forever remaining autonomous, 
philosophy will as ever offer architecture the philosophical concept; architecture 
in return, the possibility of its projection, that is, the potential of its materiality 
in the architectural concept as ‘detail’ to become real. Thus, “The Architectural 
Philosophy,” becomes analogous to Metaphilosophy,44 along with the particular 
philosophy of the architect, tied primarily to architectural creation, that is, the 
production of architectural concepts, becomes the basis for the construction of 
“the philosophy platform of the architect.” My suggestion for a philosophical 
platform for the architect is the idea in which the value of differences of 
philosophical concepts can become that which will in the new architectural 
repetition produce the authentic drawing of architectural difference. This is the 
new architectural concept.
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